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Abstract:  This paper focuses on the ability of the labor market to correctly match heterogeneous workers 
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significant gains from globalization that have not been identified in the past – globalization may improve 
the efficiency of the matching process in the labor market. These results remain unchanged after adding 
controls for technical change at the industry level or measures of domestic anti-competitive regulations 
and product market competition. Our results are also robust to alternative measures of the degree of 
matching, openness, or the trade status of an industry.    
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Globalization and Imperfect Labor Market Sorting 
 
A recent article in the Quad-City Times (based in Davenport, Iowa) chronicled how a variety of 
local residents have been forced to take less-than-ideal jobs to survive the recent recession.
1 The stories 
included those of a former mechanical engineer now employed as a truck driver, a computer programmer 
with 30 years of experience now working as a freelance writer, and a recent graduate with a degree in 
sports management working at Taco Bell.   These workers do not show up in any of the labor statistics 
used to measure the performance of the economy  – they are not unemployed, nor are they discouraged 
workers or part-time employees, so they would not be included in any measure of “underemployment” – 
but their predicaments are seen as sure signs that the economy is not operating efficiently.  This article is 
not unique – it would be easy to find dozens of similar articles with a simple internet search.  Many 
articles were present before the onset of the recession.  At that point, they tended to focus on the role that 
globalization may play in destroying jobs and forcing workers to seek alternative employment (examples 
would include x-rays being sent to India to be read and technical call centers recently established in 
foreign countries).  The concerns that are front and center in both types of articles are that the labor 
market may not be correctly assigning workers and their skills to tasks within the economy.  This type of 
labor-market  mismatch is difficult to  measure and  the  factors that influence the  degree  of imperfect 
matching are not well understood.  This paper focuses on the ability of the labor market to correctly 
match workers to jobs within a given industry and the role that globalization plays in that process.          
The  idea  that  workers  with  heterogeneous  abilities  could  be  mismatched  with  firms  with 
heterogeneous  skill  requirements  dates  back  to  the  classic  paper  by  Becker  (1973)  on  the  marriage 
market.
2  Becker introduced the issue by pointing out that men differ in a variety of attributes including 
physical capital, intelligence, education, wealth and physical characteristics and it  is unclear how these 
                                                           
1 See “Underemployment keeps many Quad-Citians heads above water,” in the Local Business section of the Quad-
Cities Times, April 11, 2010. 
2 Closely related to the matching problem described by Becker is the “assignment problem” associated with early 
models by Tinbergen (1951) and Roy (1951) (see Sattinger 1993 for a survey).  Becker is concerned with one-to-one 
matching – matching males and females in the marriage market or a single worker with a firm in the labor market.  
Assignment models focus on firms that hire multiple workers and then assign those workers to a variety of tasks.   2 
 
men ought to be matched with similarly heterogeneous women. Becker argued that under reasonable 
assumptions about the household production function, positive assortative matching – the matching of 
men and women with similar attributes – would be optimal.  Similar issues apply to the labor market 
where even in narrowly defined industries firms differ in the technologies they use, the skill-mix of their 
workforces, and the wages that they pay (Doms, Dunne and Troske 1997) and workers differ in education, 
physical attributes and raw ability.  A large literature has developed in search theory devoted to finding 
conditions  under  which  positive  assortative  matching  is  optimal  in  labor  markets  with  two-sided 
heterogeneity and conditions under which the market outcome yields the optimal pattern of sorting (e.g., 
Shimer and Smith 2000 and Legros and Newman 2002, 2007).  For the labor market, positive assortative 
matching translates into the most productive firms employing the most highly skilled workers.  
Davidson,  Matusz,  and  Shevchenko  (2008)  provide insight  into  the effects  that  globalization 
might have on labor market mismatch.  Their model, henceforth referenced as the DMS model, consists 
of a perfectly competitive industry populated by heterogeneous firms that differ in the sophistication of 
the technology that they use and heterogeneous workers differentiated by ability.  High-ability workers 
are better suited for the jobs created by high-tech firms, so that positive assortative matching is optimal.  
However, the existence of labor market frictions implies that equilibrium sorting may be imperfect – that 
is, some high-ability workers may accept low-tech jobs if they happen to be matched with low-tech firms 
first and those firms can afford to offer a wage high enough to induce them to stop searching. As in any 
model of trade with heterogeneous firms, it is those firms that adopt the modern technology (the most 
productive  firms)  that  have  the  greatest  access  to  international  markets.  Changes  in  the  degree  of 
openness therefore have a disproportionate effect on the profitability of adopting the modern technology.  
As trade costs fall, the mix of firm types and the wage offers that they can afford to make are altered.  The 
key predictions are that (a) in comparative-advantage industries greater openness leads to better labor 
market  sorting
3 and (b) in  comparative-disadvantage  industries greater openness may increase the 
                                                           
3 Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010) derive similar results in that they show that greater openness amplifies 
differences in the workforce across firms.  In particular, in their setting openness strengthens the correlation between 3 
 
mismatch between workers and firms.
4 Both of the results are driven by how openness affects the relative 
revenues earned by high-tech and low-tech firms in perfectly competitive markets.    
Our goal in this paper is to test these sharp predictions about openness and imperfect matching 
using matched worker-firm data from Sweden.  We are mainly interested in how matching has changed 
over time, whether openness can explain this change, and whether the effect of openness differs between 
comparative-advantage and comparative-disadvantage industries. The data requirements to carry-out this 
exercise are demanding.  We need extensive information about workers, firms, and their employment 
relationships over time.  The Swedish data set is ideal for this, since it is  both extensive, including 
roughly 50% of the workforce and all firms in Sweden with more than 20 employees, and rich in detail 
concerning worker characteristics, firm characteristics and employment relationships.  The data set is also 
characterized by considerable worker mobility, allowing us to avoid the issue of “limited mobility bias” 
that has been associated with previous empirical studies of assortative matching using linked employee-
employer data (see Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward 2008).  We construct the measure of the degree of 
matching  in  disaggregated  industries  using  both  observed  attributes  and  unobserved  fixed  effects  of 
workers and firms. The unobserved worker and firm effects are estimated using the approach taken by 
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and the literature that has followed.   
To identify  the  effect of openness  on the  degree  of  matching,  we  use different  measures  of 
openness.  Our preferred measure of openness is tariffs.  Reducing foreign tariffs imposed on Swedish 
exports increases market access for Swedish firms and widens the revenue gap between exporters and 
non-exporters, while a reduction in Swedish tariffs imposed on foreign imports may intensify import 
competition narrowing the gap.
5 The main advantage of using tariffs is that they can be considered as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
firm productivity and average worker ability.  This is consistent with greater openness resulting in an increase in 
positive assortative matching. 
4 We use the terms “comparative-advantage industries” and “comparative-disadvantage industries” to be consistent 
with Bernard et al. (2007).  Since the firms are assumed to be perfectly competitive, we could also refer to these as 
“export-oriented” and “import-competing” industries. 
5 A reduction in Swedish import tariffs also reduces production costs for producers who use imported intermediate 
goods.  A reduction in Swedish import tariffs could  reduce the profit gap between exporters and non-exporters if 
more productive firms (the exporters) use more imported intermediate inputs than less productive firms.   4 
 
exogenous after 1995 when Sweden joined the European Union. It is unlikely that a small country like 
Sweden can have a substantial impact on the level of tariffs set by the EU.  In addition, foreign tariffs are 
not affected by conditions in Swedish industries.  
Figure  1  gives  us a first glance  of the  Swedish  data.  In  the  plot, the degree of  matching  is 
measured by the correlation coefficient between worker and firm total effects (including both observed 
and  unobserved  attributes)  (see  Section  3.B  for  more  details  about  the  measure),  and  openness  is 
measured by foreign tariffs imposed on Swedish exports. Over the sample period, the degree of matching 
increased  steadily  while  foreign  tariffs  were  reduced.  Therefore,  the  plot  displays  a  strong  positive 
correlation between openness and positive assortative matching. However, this positive correlation may 
reflect a  spurious  correlation  rather than  a  causal  effect  of  openness on the  degree  of  matching.  To 
identify the effect of openness on the degree of matching, we exploit the within-industry and over-time 
variation in the measures of openness and the degree of matching. In addition, the DMS model predicts 
that more openness increases the degree of matching for industries with greater comparative advantage. 
Thus, in the empirical analysis we also look at whether the effect of openness is systematically related to 
the trade status of an industry as predicted by the DMS model. Finally, to identify the effect of openness 
we also control for other industry-level time-varying factors that may affect the degree of matching. Both 
Acemoglu (1999) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) argue that skill-biased technical change increases the 
degree of positive assortative matching. Product market competition may also affect the profitability of 
firms  and  the  degree  of  matching  between  firms  and  workers.  Thus,  in  our  investigation  of  the 
relationship between openness and assortative matching, we add industry-level controls for those factors.   
We find strong evidence that openness improves the matching between workers and firms in 
industries with greater comparative advantage. This suggests that there may be significant gains from 
globalization that have not been identified in the past  – globalization may improve the efficiency of 
matching in the labor market. This result remains unchanged after adding controls for technical change at 
the industry level or measures of domestic anti-competitive regulations and product market competition. 5 
 
Our results are also robust to alternative measures of the degree of matching, openness, or the trade status 
of an industry.    
There are at least two reasons to focus on globalization’s influence over labor market sorting.  
The first has to do with the aforementioned public perception that trade-induced job displacement results 
in  significant  losses  for  some  highly-skilled  workers  by  forcing  them  to  accept  less  preferred  jobs. 
However, our empirical results do not provide any support for this view. In fact, our results suggest that 
globalization  creates  a  pure  gain  by  improving  the  efficiency  of  matching  in  comparative-advantage 
industries without causing the matching process to deteriorate in comparative-disadvantage industries. 
   The second reason to focus on the link between imperfect matching and globalization has to do 
with the recent emphasis on firm heterogeneity for a variety of trade-related issues.  Empirical findings 
generated  over  the  past  15  years  indicate  that  in  comparative-advantage  industries  not  all  firms  are 
engaged in exporting.  Firms that export tend to be larger, more capital intensive and pay higher wages 
than their counterparts that sell all of their output domestically.  In addition, globalization appears to 
magnify the degree of firm heterogeneity by reallocating market shares in favor of the highly productive 
firms.
6  This makes the strongest firms stronger and the weakest firms weaker.  It is now widely accepted 
that firm heterogeneity within a given industry is an essential component of “new, new” trade models. 
On the other side of the labor market it should be clear that there are significant differences across 
workers in terms of skills. For example, studies by Barro and Lee (1993, 1996, 2001) document the wide 
disparity  of  educational  attainment  within  most  countries.  Grossman  and  Maggi  (2000)  use  data  on 
literacy scores within and across countries to make the same point.  Thus, there is ample evidence that 
labor  markets  within  narrowly  defined  industries  are  characterized  by  two-sided  heterogeneity.    In 
addition, the empirical literature on job creation and job destruction (e.g., Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 
1996) suggests that the labor market does not always perfectly match workers to jobs as we observe 
considerable churning even within stable industries as workers and firms sever relationships in search of 
                                                           
6 See Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) for an excellent survey of the work on heterogeneous firms and 
trade.  Citations to the papers that have provided these stylized facts are included in the survey. 6 
 
better matches.  As we noted earlier, the factors that influence the degree of imperfect matching in the 
labor market are not yet well understood. This is particularly true with respect to the role of globalization. 
Although  there  is  now  extensive  research,  both  empirical  and  theoretical,  that  explores  the 
implications of firm-level heterogeneity for international trade, the literature on worker heterogeneity and 
trade is far more limited and has grown more slowly.  Grossman and Maggi (2000) was one of the earliest 
contributions.  One of their main goals was to show that the distribution of talent could be a source of 
comparative advantage.  Grossman and Maggi assume that all firms within a sector are identical, so they 
are focusing on the sorting of heterogeneous workers across sectors with different production processes.  
They also assume competitive markets so that matching is always efficient – thus, the type of labor-
market mismatch that we are interested in studying cannot arise in their setting.  These same features can 
be found in the other important papers on labor market sorting and trade, including Grossman (2004), 
Yeaple (2005), Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Kremer and Maskin (2006), Ohnsorge and 
Trefler (2007), Costinot (2009) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) – most focus on sorting across industries 
and all assume competitive labor markets.
 7   In contrast, we are interested in the impact of globalization 
on the imperfect sorting of heterogeneous workers across heterogeneous firms within the same industry.  
In the next section, we provide a more detailed description of the DMS model and its predictions.  
We also compare the mechanism that drives the results in the DMS framework to a similar mechanism at 
work in Acemoglu (1999).  In section 3 we describe the empirical approach that we take and discuss the 
data set and measurement issues.  Our empirical results are presented in Section 4.   
2.  The Theory 
To understand the forces that drive our predictions we begin by reviewing the insights on trade 
and matching from Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2008).   Their model, which is an open-economy 
extension of Albrecht and Vroman (2002), allows for heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market.  On 
                                                           
7 Yeaple (2005) is an exception here – he has heterogeneous workers sorting across two types of firms with the same 
industry.  But, he assumes competitive labor markets so that sorting is optimal.  The frameworks used by Costinot 
(2009) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) are also flexible enough that they could be used to study sorting within a 
sector – but, again, they assume competitive labor markets so that sorting would always be efficient.   7 
 
the supply side, there are two types of workers: high-ability and low-ability.  On the demand side, ex-ante 
identical perfectly competitive firms must adopt a technology when entering the market and, as in Yeaple 
(2005), incentives exist such that more than one technology is selected in equilibrium.  This gives rise to 
firm-heterogeneity.    There  are  two  potential  technologies  that firms  may  use.    Those  that select  the 
modern technology (high-tech firms) must recruit a high-ability worker in order to produce; whereas 
those that adopt the basic technology (low-tech firms) can produce using either type of worker.  Each firm 
employs one worker and a variable amount of capital to produce its good.  The productivity of a firm is 
tied  to  the  ability  of  its  worker  with  high-ability  workers  more  productive  than  their  low-ability 
counterparts.  However, high ability workers are more costly to hire since they can command a higher 
wage.  Thus, firms that adopt the modern technology will be more productive and earn more revenue, but 
they will also incur higher labor costs.  Capital is rented in a spot market after the worker is hired.  In 
contrast, frictions in the labor market force workers to search for jobs.  Search is random, with workers 
negotiating their wages once hired so that, as in most search models, the equilibrium wage is given by the 
Nash Bargaining Solution.  Since search is costly, firms and workers may end up mismatched in that a 
worker may find it optimal to accept a less than ideal job if the expected benefit from continuing to search 
for a better job is lower than the cost of additional search.   
DMS make the usual assumptions with respect to entry in that all firms must pay a fixed cost to 
set-up production and incur an additional fixed cost to access world markets.  The fixed cost of exporting 
implies that some firms may decide to sell all of their output domestically.  Upon entry, each firm selects 
a technology and posts a vacancy.  The proportion of firms that select the basic technology and the total 
mass of firms producing are determined by free entry conditions.  We follow DMS and use  to denote 
the proportion of vacancies that are unfilled and tied to low-tech firms.  We are interested in equilibria of 
the  DMS  model  in  which  1 0    so  that  the  market  is  characterized  by  both  firm  and  worker 
heterogeneity.  In addition, we focus on the case in which the model’s parameters are such that high-8 
 
ability  workers  are  better  matched  when  employed  by  high-tech  firms.    This  implies  that  positive 
assortative matching is optimal – that is, high-ability workers should be matched with high-tech firms.   
There are two types of equilibria in this model depending on whether high-ability workers are 
willing  to  accept low-tech jobs.    If  they  are  willing  to  do so,  then  we  have  a  Cross-Skill-Matching 
equilibrium in which some high-ability workers are underemployed (or mismatched) in equilibrium  – 
that is, there is imperfect sorting in the labor market.  While these workers are better suited for high-tech 
employment, they accept low-tech jobs if they happen to match with low-tech firms first and if low-tech 
firms can afford to pay a wage high enough to induce these workers to stop searching.  This can occur if 
the revenues earned by the two types of firms are sufficiently close to each other.  In the other type of 
equilibrium, high-ability workers search until they find high-tech jobs.  Such an Ex-Post Segmentation 
equilibrium exists if the revenues earned by the two types of firms are sufficiently different so that low-
tech firms cannot afford to pay high ability workers enough to induce them to stop searching. 
The model is summarized in Figure 2.  Firms that enter pay the fixed cost of entry, select a 
technology  and  post  a  vacancy.    Unemployed  workers  are  then  randomly  matched  with  firms  with 
vacancies.  If the firm and the worker can agree on a wage, the firm rents capital and then production 
takes place. Production continues until the match breaks-up, which occurs at a constant rate.  Once the job 
is destroyed, the partners reenter the search process.  If the firm can increase profit by exporting some of 
its output, it pays the fixed cost of exporting and sells its goods on the world market at the world price of 
p
*.  Alternatively, firms can sell some or all of their output in the domestic market where the price is p.   
There are three types of firms that may be observed in equilibrium: high-tech firms matched with 
high-ability workers (type H); low-tech firms matched with low-ability workers (type L); and low-tech 
firms matched with high-ability workers.  If we use M to denote the measure of the last type of firm, then 
M  > 0 in a Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium and M = 0 in an Ex-Post Segmentation equilibrium.  Firms 
enter until the expected profit from creating a high-tech vacancy or a low-tech vacancy are driven to zero; 
and, since both values are driven to zero, in equilibrium firms are indifferent about the type of vacancy 
they create.  Low-ability workers are only offered low-tech jobs and they always accept them.  High-9 
 
ability workers accept a low-tech job if the wage offered exceeds their expected value from continuing to 
search  for  a  high-tech job.    One  feature  of the  model  that is  worth  highlighting  concerns the  wage 
structure.  If we use wi to denote the wage paid by a type i firm, we first note that wH > wM.  This follows 
from the fact that high-ability workers are more productive when employed by high-tech firms.  Second, 
since high-ability workers employed by low-tech firms have better outside opportunities than their low-
ability counterparts, they can demand a higher wage from low-tech firms – thus, wM > wL. 
As in other models with heterogeneous firms (e.g., Melitz 2003; Yeaple 2005; Bernard et al 2003) 
the most productive firm (in our case, high-tech firms) enjoy the strongest incentive to export while the 
least productive firms (in our case, low-tech firms matched with low-ability workers) have the weakest 
incentives to do so.   The implication is that as trade costs fall, the most productive firms expand at the 
expense of the least productive firms – that is, market shares are reallocated in favor of high-tech firms.  
For our purposes, the main insights from DMS are that (1) openness affects relative revenues earned by 
the high-tech and low-tech firms and (2) the manner in which relative revenues are affected depends on 
the industry’s trade position.  In comparative-advantage markets, increasing openness makes it easier for 
all firms to sell their goods on world markets, where the world price exceeds the domestic price.  And, 
since high-tech firms have greater incentive to export than low-tech firms and since they employ the most 
productive workers in the industry, openness increases the spread between the revenues earned by the 
types of firms.  As a result, as markets become more open, low-tech firms will have a harder time 
attracting and retaining high-skilled workers.  The implication is that if the economy begins in a Cross-
Skill Matching equilibrium, increased openness can destroy it by making it impossible for low-tech firms 
to  attract  high-ability  workers.    Alternatively,  if  the  economy  remains  in  a  Cross-Skill  Matching 
equilibrium, the frequency with which workers and firms are mismatched declines as openness increases.   
Tracing through the forces that drive these results provides insight into how the model works.  As 
trade costs fall, type H firms take advantage by producing more and exporting a greater share of their 
output.  This increases the surplus to be split between the type H firms and their workers, resulting in an 
increase in wH.  The increase in wH implies that the outside opportunities for all high-ability workers have 10 
 
improved and this triggers an increase in wM.  The increase in wM may be large enough that it makes it 
unprofitable for low-tech firms to hire these workers.  If so, the Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium is 
destroyed.  If the Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium remains intact, then the increase in wM reduces the 
profits for low-tech firms, resulting in some exit.  In addition, the fall in trade costs induces entry by high-
tech firms.  As a result, fewer high-ability workers wind up employed by low-tech firms. 
To summarize, this model yields a rather sharp prediction about how match quality ought to be 
linked to openness in comparative-advantage industries.  As markets become more open, more high-
ability workers should be matched with high-tech firms, whereas a higher fraction of low-tech firms 
should  be  matched  with  low-ability  workers.  Thus,  in  comparative-advantage  industries  increased 
openness should lead to a more efficient allocation of talent.  This could be viewed as a new (potentially 
important) gain from trade.
8 
The DMS predictions are reversed for  comparative-disadvantage industries.  In these industries, 
globalization leads to a reduction in the market price   p,  as  new,  lower-priced  substitute  goods  are 
imported from world markets.  This lowers the revenues earned by all domestic firms and shrinks the gap 
between the revenues earned by low-tech and high-tech firms, making it easier for low-tech firms to 
attract and retain highly-skilled workers.  The implication is that if the economy begins in an Ex Post 
Segmentation  equilibrium,  increased  openness  can  cause  the  economy  to  switch  to  a  Cross-Skill 
Matching equilibrium as low-tech firms suddenly find that it is possible to attract high-ability workers.  
Alternatively, if the economy starts in a Cross-Skill Matching equilibrium, the frequency with which 
workers and firms are mismatched will increase as openness increases.  As a result, greater openness 
ought to lead to an increase in the average quality of the workers hired by low-tech firms.  Once again, we 
                                                           
8 There  are  two  caveats  to  this  claim.    First,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  this  assumes  complementarities 
between worker skills and the sophistication of the technology used by firms.  In such complementarities are absent, 
or if these attributes of the production process are actually substitutes, then other matching patterns might be more 
efficient.  Second, even when such complementarities are present, the presence of search frictions will constrain the 
economy, keeping it from reaching the first-best outcome.  And, we know from the literature on search theory that 
we should expect at least some worker/firm mismatch in the constrained efficient outcome.  Thus, for our results to 
suggest that openness will lead to new gains from trade, it must be the case that the initial market-induced allocation 
of labor across firms is characterized by an inefficiently high degree of mismatch. 
 11 
 
have a rather sharp prediction about the link between openness and the efficiency of the labor market:  in 
comparative-disadvantage industries an increase in openness should lead to a less efficient allocation of 
talent in the labor market.  This could be viewed as a new cost of globalization. 
In terms of empirical work, one limitation of the DMS model is that the assumption of perfect 
competition in the product market is inconsistent with intra-industry trade.  In reality, almost all industries 
are characterized by two-way trade.  We would expect that increased openness due to (for example) a 
reduction  in  trade  costs  would  result  in  more  export  opportunities  as  well  as  more  intense  import 
competition in any particular industry.  The DMS model predicts that the increased export activity would 
result in better labor market sorting while the increase in import penetration would lead to less efficient 
sorting.  One way to account for these two competing forces in our empirical work would be to use a 
continuous measure of trade status, one that measures the proportion of trade that is tied to export activity 
and also captures the pattern of comparative advantage.  We introduce such a measure in Section 3 below. 
We close this section with a brief discussion of Acemoglu (1999), the work that is most closely 
related  to  ours.    Acemoglu  presents  a  closed-economy  model  in  which  high-skilled  and  low-skilled 
workers search across (possibly) heterogeneous firms for jobs.  He shows that two types of equilibria can 
exist.  In the first, some firms create high-tech jobs and match only with high-skilled workers while other 
firms create low-tech jobs and match only with low-skilled workers.  In the other equilibrium, all firms 
create the same type of jobs and match with both types of workers.  Since all firms adopt the same 
strategy,  this  is  a  pooling  equilibrium.    Acemoglu  refers  to  the  jobs  associated  with  the  pooling 
equilibrium  as  “middling”  and  shows  that  middling  jobs  will  be  offered  only  when  the  relative 
productivity of high-skilled versus low-skilled workers is not too great; otherwise, equilibrium entails 
separation.    Thus,  skill-biased  technical  change,  which  widens  the  gap  between  the  workers’ 
productivities, can move the economy from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium.
9  When this 
happens, high-skilled workers gain and low-skilled workers are harmed.  In the latter part of his paper, 
                                                           
9 See Albrecht and Vroman (2002) for a similar argument.   12 
 
Acemoglu offers a variety of evidence that in many industries middling jobs have been disappearing and 
have been replaced by the type of jobs that would be offered in a separating equilibrium.
10 
 If  we  apply  the  logic  presented  in  this  paper  to  Acemoglu’s  model,  the  conclusion  is  that 
openness should cause middling jobs to disappear in comparative-advantage industries and appear in 
comparative-disadvantage  industries.    This  follows  from  the  fact  that  exporting  increases  the  spread 
between the revenues that the two types of workers can generate, just like skill-biased technical change in 
Acemoglu’s  framework,  while  import  competition  decreases  this  spread.    In  his  empirical  analysis, 
Acemoglu does not separate his industries into groups based on their trade status.  Our model suggests 
that doing so might allow for a direct test of our model’s prediction that openness can alter the nature of 
the labor-market equilibrium.  That is the issue that we take up in the next two sections of this paper. 
3. Empirical Specification, Data and Measurement 
To examine our theoretical predictions, we use the following specification: 
                                                                             (1) 
where  g  indexes  industries;  t  indexes  years;            
represents the  degree  of  matching  between 
workers and firms;        measures the degree of openness;           indicates the trade status of 
industry g;    and    represent year and industry fixed effects; and     is the error term that includes all 
unobserved factors that may affect the degree of matching. Details about the measurement of the degree 
of matching, openness, and the industry trade status are given in the sections on data and measurement. 
The year fixed effects control for the omitted macroeconomic factors that may affect the degree 
of  matching.  The  industry  fixed  effects  may  capture  the  cross-industry  difference  in  the  degree  of 
matching as a result of differences in production technology across industries. Because specification (1) 
controls for both year and industry fixed effects, identification of the openness effect on matching relies 
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been documented for the US, UK and Europe by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006), Goos and Manning (2007) and 
Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009), respectively. 13 
 
on within-industry over-time variation in the degree of matching and openness.  The DMS model predicts 
that more openness increases the degree of matching for industries with greater comparative advantage. 
To test this prediction, we include an interaction between openness and the trade status of an industry in 
(1). The prediction about how the effect of openness should vary systematically across industries by trade 
status can also help us to separate the effect of openness on the degree of matching from the effect of 
other factors, e.g., skill-biased technical change, because the impact of those factors on the degree of 
matching does not differ systematically between industries by their trade status. 
A.  Data Sources 
We use a matched employer-employee database with detailed information on Swedish firms and 
establishments  linked  with  a  large  sample  of  individuals  for  the  period  1995-2005.
11 The data  on 
individual workers contain wage statistics based on Statistics Sweden’s annual salary surveys and are 
supplemented by material from a series of other data registers. The dataset covers more than two million 
individuals  (accounting  for  roughly  50%  of  the  labor  force)  and  includes  information  on  workers 
education, occupation, sector, and demographics.  The plant-level data add establishment information on 
the composition of the labor force with respect to educational level and demographics.
12   
Firm data are based on Statistics Sweden’s financial statistics, covering all Swedish firms and 
containing variables such as productivity, investments, capital stock, number of employees, the wage bill, 
value added, profits, sales, a foreign ownership dummy, multinational status, and industry affiliation. See 
Table A1 in the appendix for a description of the variables. 
B.  Measuring the Degree of Matching 
The degree of matching between workers and firms can be measured simply based on observed 
worker and firm characteristics. For example, high-tech firms can be characterized as those with higher 
capital intensity and high-skilled workers can be characterized as those with more years of education. 
                                                           
11 There are at least two major advantages to using the period 1995-2005. Firstly, the firm data set includes the 
whole population of firms (previous years include only a sample of the smaller firms). Secondly, Sweden joined the 
EU in 1995 and changes in tariffs can then be considered exogenous. 
12 The plant-level data are aggregated to the firm level. In the following, we only use ‘firms.’ 14 
 
However, the degree of matching may also be affected by unobserved worker and firm attributes. In fact, 
previous studies on assortative matching (e.g., Goux and Maurin, 1999; Abowd et al., 2002; Andrews et 
al., 2006) focus on the correlation between unobserved firm and worker effects. Our objective, however, 
is to examine if good workers tend to work for good firms. The quality of firms and workers should 
include  both  observed  and  unobserved  aspects.  Thus,  unlike  the  previous  literature  on  assortative 
matching, our benchmark measure is based on both observed and unobserved worker and firm attributes. 
In Table 2 we will show that our empirical results are similar whether we use the benchmark measure or 
use the measure based on just unobservables.  Furthermore, in light of empirical evidence that workers 
mostly move within industries, we construct the measure at the industry level rather than at the national 
level as done in the literature.
13 
To obtain estimates of unobserved worker and firm attributes, we run the following regression: 
                       (   )        (   )                                                                 (2)  
where        is the log wage of worker h at time t,   (   ) is worker h’s employer at time t,     is a 
vector of observable time-varying worker characteristics,    is the worker fixed effect,   (   )   is a vector 
of observable time-varying firm characteristics,   (   ) is the firm fixed effect,    is the year fixed effect, 
and     is the error term. Equation (2) is a three-way fixed effects model which extends the Abowd et al. 
(1999) specification by adding firm-specific time-varying variables.  
To avoid possible bias arising from differences in the number of work hours, the dependent 
variable  is  measured  as  full-time  equivalent  wages.
14 Time-varying  worker  characteristics  include 
experience  squared,  higher-degree  polynomials  of experience, and a dummy variable for blue -collar 
occupations.
15 Since education is time invariant, it is subsumed in the worker fixed effects. Time-varying 
                                                           
13 See Levinsohn (1999), Haltiwanger et al. (2004),Wacziarg and Wallack (2004),  Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), 
and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) for evidence on worker mobility. 
14  The wages for workers who take a maternity/paternity leave are reported as the same as prior to their leave. 
15 In our sample experience is constructed as age minus number of years o f schooling minus seven. Because the 
years of schooling rarely change in the sample, with both individual and year fixed effects included, experience 
varies directly with the year fixed effects, that is, the impact of experience on wages is captured by the  year fixed 
effects. Therefore, experience is excluded from equation (2).  15 
 
firm characteristics include capital intensity, firm size (number of employees), labor productivity (value 
added per worker), share of high-skill workers (i.e., share of the labor force with at least 3 years of post- 
secondary  education),  manufacturing  indicator,  share  of  female  workers  and  its  interaction  with  the 
manufacturing indicator.
16   
There are several estimation issues surrounding specification (2).  Our Swedish data for 1995 -
2005 consist of almost 10 million individual-year observations. Computer memory restraints preclude 
using the least -square dummy vari able (LSDV) approach to estimating   a model with millions of 
individual effects and thousands of firm effects. To solve this problem we use a memory saving algorithm 
to estimate three-way fixed effect models in Stata (see Cornelissen, 2006; Andrews el al., 2006). We 
include firm dummies and sweep out the worker effects by the within transformation. Firm effects are 
identified from workers who move b etween firms over the period. Non -movers add nothing to the 
estimation of the firm effects so the firm effect will not be identified for firms with no movers. Worker 
effects are estimated from repeated observations per worker, implying that the data must i nclude a 
sufficient number of both multiple observations of workers and movers of individuals across firms. This 
approach, labeled as FEiLSDVj
17 by Andrews et al. (2006), gives the same solution as the LSDV 
estimator and allows us to recover the individual and firm specific effects (   and   (   )).  
Since identification of worker and firm effects relies on the mobility of workers across firms, 
increasing the number of observations per worker and the number of movers per firm provides more 
precise estimates. The median number of observations per worker is four in our sample (see Table A3 in 
the Appendix).  The median value of movers is above 30 and only 3 percent of the firms have no movers 
(see Table A4 in the Appendix). More information on movers is given in Table A5 in the Appendix where 
movers are shown within and between industries categorized as comparative advantage/dis-advantage 
industries as discussed below. Most workers are moving within industries: around 76 percent. Moreover, 
                                                           
16 We also ran wage regressions by excluding some of the firm/worker characteristics, e.g., the share of high skilled 
workers, manufacturing indicator, share of female workers, and its interaction with the manufacturing indicator. Our 
results are robust to these alternative specifications. 
17 The abbreviation stands for  Fixed Effect for individual  i combined with LSDV for firm j. We use the program 
felsdvreg (see Cornelissen 2006), which is a memory saving algorithm to estimate FEiLSDVj in Stata. 16 
 
looking at the figures at different levels of industry classification, it is seen that the share of movers 
within industries declines with more detailed industry classifications but account for a majority of total 
movers even at a 3-digit industry level. 
The mobility is high compared to many previous studies and brings the advantage of getting all 
firms, except the 3 percent with no movers, into the same grouping: meaning that they are connected by 
worker mobility. For the period 1995-2005, the mover group consists of over 9.45 million person-year 
observations and 8,465 unique firms. The group of firms with no movers only consists of 1,917 person-
year observations and 309 unique firms. This is important since the correlation coefficient between firm 
and person effects can only be estimated within groups (see e.g. Cornelissen, 2006;  Cornelissen and 
Hubler 2007). In addition, the high level of mobility in the Swedish data allows us to avoid limited 
mobility bias, which tends to lead to zero or negative correlation coefficients (see Andrews, Gill, Schank 
and Upward 2008). We follow Cornelissen and Hubler (2007) and only include workers that are observed 
in at least two periods and firms that have at least five movers. 
Results from the individual wage regressions for the period 1995-2005 are presented in Table 1. 
Column 1 reports the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates in which both firm and worker fixed 
effects  are  excluded.  As  expected,  more  experienced  workers  earn  higher  wages,  but  the  return  to 
experience  has  a  declining  rate.  Blue-collar  workers  earn  lower  wages  than  white-collar  workers. 
Moreover, larger firms, more productive and capital intensive firms, and firms with a bigger share of 
more skilled workers pay higher wages.  
Column  2  displays  the  estimates  of  the  three-way  fixed  effect  model  in  equation  (2).  The 
coefficient on the dummy variable for blue-collar occupations remains negative, although the magnitude 
of the coefficient is greatly reduced after controlling for unobserved worker fixed effects. Similar to the 
OLS estimates, bigger firms, firms with higher productivity and a higher share of skilled workers pay 
higher  wages.  However,  in  contrast  to  column  1,  the  estimated  coefficient  on  capital  intensity  turns 
negative after controlling for firm effects. The capital intensity variable only picks up variation within 
each firm over time since we have firm fixed effects.  Because employment is easier to adjust than capital, 17 
 
one possible explanation for the negative coefficient on capital intensity is that firms shed workers and 
restrain wages when hit by a negative shock.  In this case, higher capital intensity is associated with lower 
wages. In addition, the estimates in column 2 suggest that in the manufacturing sector firms with a higher 
share of female workers pay a lower wage. Overall, the results in column 2 seem reasonable. 
Based on the estimates of equation (2) as reported in column 2 of Table 1, we compute the 
measure  of  human  capital  based  on  both  observed  worker  abilities  (    )  and  unobserved  worker 
attributes (  ). Workers with higher human capital level are considered as more skilled. At the same time, 
firms that pay a higher wage premium (i.e. higher   (   )        (   )) are considered as good firms. Our 
benchmark measure of the degree of matching is calculated as the correlation coefficient between worker 
total effects (         ) and firm total effects (  (   )        (   )). On the aggregate level, the correlation 
coefficient is around 0.10, which indicates positive assortative matching at the national level. In order to 
compare our estimates with the prior literature, we also calculate the correlation between unobserved firm 
and worker effects (  (   ) 
and   ). The estimated correlation coefficients of unobserved effects range 
from  0.03  to  0.06.  This  positive  correlation  is  in  contrast  with  the  finding  of  no  or  even  negative 
correlations in many other studies (Goux and Maurin, 1999; Abowd et al., 2002; Barth and Dale-Olsen, 
2003; Gruetter and Lalive, 2004; Andrews et al., 2006; Cornelissen and Hubler 2007).  However, our 
figures are close to the correlation of 0.08 found for France in the study by Abowd et al. (1999). They are 
also in line with the study by Andrews el al. (2008) who analyze how sensitive the correlation is to the 
share of movers in the data.  They report a positive correlation when they study movers in high turnover 
plants. Table A6 in the Appendix lists the correlation coefficients for different samples. Overall, the 
estimated correlation coefficients between firm and worker total effects are robust to the exclusion of 
firms with few movers or workers with few observations.   
C.  Measuring Openness  
Our preferred measure of openness is tariffs. A reduction in foreign tariffs imposed on Swedish 
exports increases market access for Swedish firms.  A reduction in Swedish tariffs imposed on foreign 18 
 
imports may intensify import competition for final good producers, but may also reduce the production 
cost  for  importers  of  intermediate  inputs.  The  main  advantage  of  using  tariffs  is  that  they  can  be 
considered as exogenous after 1995 when Sweden joined the European Union. It is unlikely that a small 
country like Sweden can have a substantial impact on the level of tariffs set by the EU.  In addition, 
foreign tariffs are not affected by conditions in Swedish industries. We aggregate the six-digit HS tariff 
data  from  the  UNCTAD  TRAINS  database  up  to  the  three-digit  level  of  SNI  (Swedish  Industrial 
Classification) using trade shares as weights.
 18 Specifically, to construct the industry-level foreign tariffs, 
the shares of Swedish exports in 1995 (the first year of the sample) are used as weights. For the industry-
level Swedish tariffs on foreign goods, the shares of Swedish imports in 1995 are used as weights. Both 
foreign tariffs and Swedish tariffs were reduced over the sample period, and tariff reductions vary across 
industries. 
  In order to capture the degree of outsourcing and offshoring, our second measure of openness is 
the share of sales by multinational firms (both foreign and Swedish owned) in total sales in Sweden. 
Foreign owned multinational firms are defined as firms with above 50 percent foreign ownership and 
Swedish multinational firms are defined as Swedish owned firms with affiliates abroad. Over the sample 
period, the share of sales by multinational firms increased steadily. 
D.  Defining the Trade Orientation of an Industry 
We measure the trade orientation of an industry using the value of net exports as a share of total 
trade (imports plus exports) in 1995 for that industry. This measure has two advantages. First, it captures 
the extent of comparative advantage or comparative disadvantage an industry has. In trade models that 
combine  monopolistic  competition  and  Heckscher-Ohlin  (e.g.,  Helpman  and  Krugman,  1985)  or  the 
models that further add firm heterogeneity (e.g., Bernard et al., 2007), trade flows can be decomposed 
into  intra-industry  and  inter-industry  trade  components,  and  the  inter-industry  trade  component  is 
considered to be driven by endowment-based comparative advantage. The absolute value of our measure 
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can be interpreted  as  an inter-industry trade index.
 19 The  sign  of  our  measure  indicates  whether the 
industry has a comparative advantage or a comparative disadvantage while its absolute value measures 
the extent of comparative advantage or comparative disadvantage the industry has. As shown in Table A8 
in the appendix, the industries that have the strongest comparative advantage include mining of iron ores, 
sawmilling  and  planning  of  wood,  manufacture  of  pulp,  paper  and  paperboard,  and  manufacture  of 
builders’ carpentry and joinery, etc. These industries are based on Sweden’s abundant natural resources. 
On the other hand, the industries that have the strongest comparative disadvantage include manufacture of 
knitted  and  crocheted  articles,  footwear,  jewelry,  other  wearing  apparel  and  accessories,  luggage, 
handbags, etc. All of these industries are highly labor intensive.   
The second advantage of our measure is that unlike Balassa’s measure of revealed comparative 
advantage that looks at exports only; our measure can capture the proportion of trade that is tied to export 
versus import activities.
20 The DMS model predicts that increased export activity would result in better 
labor market sorting while  an increase in import penetration would lead to less efficient sorting. Our 
measure can help to account for these two competing forces  and thus it is particularly relevant  for our 
empirical analysis. For industries with strong comparative advantage, i.e., with a large positive value of 
net exports as a share of total trade, the effect of increased export activity  would dominate, leading to a 
positive relationship between increased market access and the degree of matching. On the other hand, for 
industries with strong comparative disadvantage, i.e., with a large negative value of net exports as a share 
of total trade, the effect of increased import penetration would dominate, resulting in a negative 
relationship between increased import competition and the degree of matching.  
As robustness checks, we define the trade orientation of an industry using a binary variable.  We 
define an industry as  having a comparative advantage  if it had positive net exports in 1995, and an 
industry as having a comparative disadvantage if it had positive net imports in 1995. We also define the 
trade orientation of an industry based on the average of net exports across years. An industry is defined as 
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20 Using our data we also computed Balassa’s measure of revealed comparative advantage. The correlation between 
the Balassa measure and our measure is remarkably high, 0.73 with a p-value less than 0.0001. 20 
 
having  a  comparative  advantage  if  it  had  a  positive  average  of  net  exports  over  the  sample  period. 
Another alternative definition is based on positive or negative net exports across years. An industry is 
considered as having a comparative advantage if it had more years with positive net exports than with 
negative net exports over the sample period. These three alternative measures of trade status are highly 
correlated – 90% of the industries have consistent definitions of trade status based on these measures.  
4.  Empirical Results on Openness and Matching 
A.  Baseline estimates 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for equation (1). Our baseline estimates include only foreign 
tariffs  as  the  measure  of  openness  because  as  will  be  shown  below,  reduced  Swedish  tariffs  have 
opposing effects on the degree of matching and thus generate insignificant estimates for the effect of 
Swedish tariffs. Note that in Table 2 the tariff data are transformed so that an increase in the independent 
variable Foreign Tariffs represents more openness.  To account for possible serial correlations within 
industries, standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit SNI industry level.
  
Column  1  of  Table  2  displays  the  results  when  the  degree  of  matching  is  measured  as  the 
correlation coefficient between worker and firm total effects. The estimated coefficient on the interaction 
between openness and our measure of comparative advantage is 0.035 with a standard error of 0.007, 
indicating that the positive effect of reduced foreign tariffs on the degree of matching is significantly 
stronger in industries with greater comparative advantage. Using the estimated coefficients on openness 
and the interaction term, we infer that reduced foreign tariffs can increase the degree of matching for 
industries with the comparative-advantage measure greater than 0.4 (0.0140.035). From Table A8 in 
the appendix, just 16 industries have a comparative advantage measure below 0.4. Thus, the estimates 
suggest that for 72 out of the 88 industries in our sample, reduced foreign tariffs have a positive impact on 
the degree of matching. The positive effect of reduced foreign tariffs on the degree of matching is the 
largest for industries with the strongest comparative advantage. For example, the industry of mining iron 
ores has the largest positive value of the comparative-advantage measure, 0.936. The estimate suggests 21 
 
that a one standard deviation of reduction in foreign tariffs (i.e., 5%) can increase the degree of matching 
in the industry of mining iron ores 1.72 times of the standard deviation.
21  
On the other hand, for industries with the greatest comparative disadvantage, reduced foreign 
tariffs may have a negative effect on the degree of matching. For example, the Manufacture of knitted and 
crocheted  articles  has  the  largest  negative  value  of  the  comparative -advantage  measure  which  is 
The estimate in column 1 implies that a 5% reduction in foreign tariffs may reduce the degree of 
matching by 56% of the standard deviation. (The computation is similar to footnote 21.)  
These results provide strong support for the DMS model. A reduction in foreign tariffs improves 
the opportunity for Swedish firms to enter or expand their presence in foreign markets. As the DMS 
model suggests, good firms will benefit more from the increased access to world markets and hire more 
highly-skilled workers. On the other hand, weak firms will only serve the domestic market and become 
less  able  to  attract  highly-skilled  workers.  As  a  result,  the  degree  of  positive  assortative  matching 
increases. Although all industries have export activities, industries with greater comparative advantage 
should have a higher share of firms that export and benefit more from reduced foreign tariffs. Thus, the 
positive effect of reduced foreign tariffs on the degree of matching is expected to be larger in industries 
with stronger comparative advantage. 
In addition, the estimates also imply that the effect of reduced foreign tariffs on the degree of 
matching is weaker for industries dominated by intra-industry trade than for industries with more inter-
industry trade. This result is consistent with the view that intra-industry trade tends to have smaller effects 
on the labor market than endowment-based inter-industry trade.  
Column 2 of Table 2 reports the results when the degree of matching is alternatively measured by 
correlating the firm total effects with the worker total effects averaged across all workers employed in the 
firm. Column 3 shows the estimates when the degree of matching is measured by a correlation between 
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tariffs may increase the degree of matching by (0.0144+0.0347×0.936) ×5 = 0.234, which is 1.72 times of the 
standard deviation of the degree of matching. See Table A2 in the appendix for the statistics on foreign tariffs and 
the degree of matching. Note that foreign tariffs are expressed in terms of percentages in the data.  22 
 
the firm total effects with the total effect of the median worker employed by the firm.  In column 4 we 
follow the literature on assortative matching and construct the measure of the degree of matching based 
on unobserved firm and worker effects. All of these alternative measures generate fairly similar results for 
the effect of openness on the degree of matching. The estimates suggest that reduced foreign tariffs have a 
stronger positive effect on the degree of matching for industries with greater comparative advantage. In 
addition, reduced foreign tariffs significantly increase the degree of positive assortative matching for the 
majority of industries in our sample, but may reduce the degree of matching for a few industries with the 
strongest comparative  disadvantage. Thus,  these  results  are consistent  with  our  baseline  estimates as 
shown in column 1.  
We also divide the sample into comparative advantage and comparative dis-advantage industries 
based on positive and negative net export in 1995, and run separate regressions for the comparative 
advantage and comparative disadvantage industries. We find that reduced foreign tariffs have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the degree of matching in comparative advantage industries, but a 
negative and statistically significant effect in comparative disadvantage industries.  
B.  Alternative measures of openness  
We now examine the robustness of our baseline results to alternative measures of the degree of 
openness. The results are displayed in Table 3.  Column 1 reports the results carried from column 1 of 
Table 2 when openness is measured by foreign tariffs. In column 2 we add Swedish tariffs on foreign 
goods as an additional measure of openness. We find that the estimated coefficients on foreign tariffs and 
the interaction with comparative advantage remain unchanged. However, we find no significant effect of 
reduced Swedish tariffs on the degree of matching. One possible explanation for this weak result is that 
reduced Swedish tariffs can have opposing effects on Swedish firms within an industry. On the one hand, 
reduced Swedish tariffs on foreign imports may intensify import competition to Swedish producers of the 
goods  that  directly  compete  with  foreign  imports.  High-tech  firms  would  suffer  more  from  import 
competition because revenue losses are bigger for high-tech firms than for low-tech firms. In this case, 23 
 
low-tech firms may be able to offer more skilled workers a wage high enough to induce them to stop 
searching for higher wage jobs. As a result, there is more mismatch between firms and workers. On the 
other  hand,  lower  Swedish  tariffs  may  reduce  the  cost  of  intermediate  inputs,  spreading  the  surplus 
between high-tech and low-tech firms, since the former are larger and therefore use more intermediates 
than the latter. As a result, it will make it harder for low-tech firms to attract more skilled workers, and 
the  degree  of  assortative  matching  improves.  Since  our  industry-level  analysis  pools  both  types  of 
producers, we cannot distinguish the different impact of reduced Swedish tariffs on different types of 
producers within an industry. Therefore, we find insignificant estimates for Swedish tariffs and include 
only foreign tariffs as the measure of openness in the baseline results. 
In column 3 we measure openness using the share of sales by multinational firms. An increased 
share of multinational sales may indicate increased economic activities associated with outsourcing or 
offshoring.  Thus,  this  measure  of  openness  helps  to  capture  another  important  aspect  of  increasing 
economic integration. The estimates in column 3 show that increased share of multinational sales have 
significantly  stronger  positive  effects  on  industries  with  greater  comparative  advantage,  which  is 
consistent with the result when openness is measured by foreign tariffs. However, unlike foreign tariffs, 
the share of multinational sales may be endogenous. If multinational production activities benefit from 
better  matching  between  firms  and  workers,  the  estimates  in  column  3  may  overstate the impact  of 
increased outsourcing or offshoring on the degree of matching. To deal with the possible reverse causality, 
we replace the contemporaneous measure of multinational sales with the measure at a one-year lag. As 
shown in column 6, the estimated coefficient on lagged multinational sales is 0.104 with a standard error 
of 0.047, which is statistically significant and larger than the estimate of 0.070 for contemporaneous 
multinational sales as reported in column 3. The estimated coefficient on the interaction with the measure 
of comparative advantage is 0.285 with a standard error of 0.131, which is also statistically significant but 
smaller than the estimate of 0.357 for contemporaneous multinational sales reported in column 3. Based 
on  the estimates  in  columns  3  and  6,  it  can be  shown  that  for industries  with  stronger  comparative 
advantage  (i.e.,  with  the  comparative-advantage  measure  greater  than  0.47)  contemporaneous 24 
 
multinational  sales  are  estimated  to  have  a  larger  positive  effect  than  lagged  multinational  sales.
22 
Therefore, this result provides  some supporting evidence that using  the contemporaneous measure of 
multinational sales  is likely to overstate the positive effect of increased outsourcing or offshoring 
activities on the degree of assortative matching for industries with greater comparative advantage.  
In columns 4-5 of Table 3 we replace the contemporaneous measures of  tariffs with those at a 
one-year lag. The results are little changed. In contrast to multinational sales, we find that  for industries 
with greater comparative advantage  lagged foreign tariffs  in fact have a larger  positive impact on the 
degree of matching than contemporaneous  foreign tariffs.  Overall, our baseline results ar e robust to 
alternative measures of openness.  
C.  Accounting  for match effects 
The Abowd-Kramarz-Margolis type wage regression can be generalized by including a match 
effect which is an interaction between workers and firms. The match effect measures returns to time-
invariant and unobserved characteristics of worker-firm matches that are common to all periods of an 
employment spell and can be interpreted as rent sharing between workers and firms. Woodcock (2008a, 
2008b)  argues  that  when  match  effects  are  omitted,  all  other  effects  are  potentially  biased.  The 
identification of person, firm and match effects requires a distinction between lucky matches (a high 
match effect) and good workers/firms. Woodcock proposes two methods: one is the orthogonal fixed 
effect method, and the other is the hybrid mixed random effect method. The orthogonal fixed effect 
estimation has two stages. First, the return to the observed worker and firm characteristics is estimated 
using the within individual/firm (“spell”) estimator. The remaining wage residual is then decomposed into 
person, firm and match effects based on the assumption that match effects are orthogonal to the firm and 
worker effects. The hybrid mixed random effect method treats worker, firm and match effects as random, 
but allow arbitrary correlation between the random effects and time-varying observable characteristics. 
                                                           
22 The estimated effect of contemporaneous multinational sales on the degree of matching is 0.070+0.357 ×      
    . The estimated effect of lagged multinational sales on the degree of matching is 0.104+0.285×           . 
It  can  be  shown  easily  that  for  industries  with  the  measure  of  trade  status,            ,  greater  than  0.47, 
contemporaneous multinational sales are estimated to have a larger positive effect on the degree of matching. 25 
 
This differs from an ordinary random effects model that would impose restrictions on the relationship 
between  observables  and  unobservables.  The  hybrid  mixed  random  effect  approach  is  again  first  to 
estimate the return to observables using the within-spell estimator. It then decomposes the wage residual 
into person, firm, and match effects under the random effects assumption, i.e., allowing the observables 
and the random effects to be correlated. The identification is based on moment restrictions on the random 
effects, which is similar to the Hausman and Taylor (1981) correlated random effects estimator.   
We estimate the wage equation (1) by adding match effects and then construct the measure of the 
degree of matching as the correlation coefficient between worker and firm total effects. Columns 2-5 of 
Table  4  report  the  results  when  these  alternative  measures  of  the  degree  of  matching  are  used.  For 
comparison, column 1 reports the baseline estimates carried from column 1 of Table 2. Overall, the table 
shows that our main results still hold when the match effects are accounted for. In particular, in columns 
2-3 when the degree of matching is calculated using estimates from the wage regression that assumes the 
match effects to be orthogonal to the firm and worker effects, the results are almost identical to the 
baseline results as shown in column 1. In columns 4-5 when the measure of matching is computed based 
on the wage regression that allow the worker and firm effects to be correlated with the match effects, the 
estimated effect of openness is somewhat smaller than the baseline result. However, the main message 
remains the same. Again, we find that reduced foreign tariffs have significantly stronger positive impacts 
on the degree of matching for industries with greater comparative advantage, and for the majority of 
industries in our sample, reduced foreign tariffs improve the degree of matching. Therefore, our main 
results are not the result of rent sharing between workers and firms triggered by increased openness. 
D.  Technical Change 
In Acemoglu (1999) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) search models are developed in which 
skill-biased technical change increases the gap between productivity of high-skill and low-skill workers; 
and, as a result, the degree of positive assortative matching rises.  However, since their models do not 
allow for trade, an industry’s trade status plays no role in their analyses. In order to separate the effect of 26 
 
openness from the effect of technical change on the degree of matching, we add several industry-level 
measures of technical change as controls. It is well known that skill-biased technical change is hard to 
measure. In the literature the share of investment in computing and communication equipment, and R&D 
expenditures  per  employee  are  often  used  as proxies  for  technical  change.  Under  the  assumption  of 
capital-skill  complementarity,  capital  deepening  can  raise  the  demand  for  skilled  workers  and  may 
increase  the  degree  of  positive  assortative  matching.  To  capture  this  aspect,  we  also  include  annual 
growth rate in capital stock and annual growth rate in capital intensity as additional controls. As shown in 
Table 5, none of the measures have any significant impact on the degree of matching. On the other hand, 
our estimates of the effect of openness remain unchanged. 
E.  Domestic anti-competitive deregulations and product market competition 
There were no major reforms  of the Swedish economy  during the period we are examining.  
However, shifts in domestic market competition may coincide with the change in openness to trade and 
foreign investment during the sample period. It is possible that increased or reduced domestic market 
competition can affect the profitability of high-tech and low-tech firms and further affect what types of 
workers they want to hire. In order to disentangle the effect of domestic market competition on the degree 
of matching from the effect of openness, we add measures of domestic deregulations and product market 
competition as controls. The estimates are shown in Table 6. 
The regulatory  indicator  captures the  amount  of  anti-competitive  regulations  at  the two-digit 
industry level and is constructed by the OECD. A higher value of the index indicates a higher degree of 
regulations.
23 Column 1 of Table 6 shows that more anti-competitive regulations lead to a higher degree 
of  positive  assortative  matching.  This  may  indicate  that  high -tech  firms  benefit  more  from  anti -
competitive regulations and hire more highly-skilled workers. On the other hand, our results for the effect 
of openness remain unchanged.  
                                                           
23 Since  the  regulations  are  anti-competitive  (e.g.,  barriers  to  competition,  administrative  burdens  on  start-ups, 
explicit barriers to trade and investment), they tend to lead to an increase in market power for incumbent firms. 27 
 
We also construct a measure of product market competition at the two-digit industry level by 
following Boone (2008) and Boone et al. (2007). This measure is based on the within-industry elasticity 
of profits with respect to marginal costs.
 24 The higher the absolute value of this elasticity, the fiercer is 
competition. The results reported in columns 2-3 of Table 6 indicate that this measure has no significant 
effect on the degree of matching. Again, our results for the effect of openness are unchanged. 
F.  Alternative definitions of the  trade status of an industry 
In the above analysis we have used a continuous measure of the trade status of an industry. In this 
section we report the results when the trade status of an industry is defined using a binary variable. The 
results are reported in Table 7. In columns 1-2 an industry is defined as having a comparative advantage if 
this  industry  had  positive  net  exports  in  1995,  and  an  industry  is  defined  as  having  a  comparative 
disadvantage if this industry had negative net exports in 1995. In column 1 foreign tariffs are used as the 
measure  of  openness.  The  estimate  for  comparative  advantage  industries  is  0.022  and  statistically 
significant. However, the estimate for comparative disadvantage industries is  0.001 and statistically 
insignificant. These results are closely related to the baseline estimate reported in column 1 of Table 2 
when the continuous measure of trade status is used. The estimate of 0.022 for comparative advantage 
industries can be considered as an average effect of reduced foreign tariffs on the degree of matching for 
industries  with  a  positive  continuous  measure  of  the  trade  status,  while  the  estimate  of  0.001  for 
comparative disadvantage industries can be considered as an average effect for industries with a negative 
continuous measure of the trade status.
25 Therefore, these results are consistent with those report ed in 
column 1 of Table 2 when the continuous measure of the trade status is used. 
                                                           
24 To obtain the measure, we run the following regression for each 2-digit SNI industry using OLS: ln(jt) = j + t 
+ t ln (cjt) + jt. Subscript j is a firm-level identifier and t indicates time period. Variable profits, jt, are defined as 
value added less the total wage bill. Marginal costs are approximated by average variable costs,  cjt, which are 
defined as the total wage bill plus the costs of variable inputs (sales less value added), divided by sales. Unobserved 
heterogeneity is taken into account by firm fixed effects, j, and time fixed effects, t. The absolute value of the 
estimated profit elasticity, t, is used as a time-varying industry measure of product market competition. 
25 Recall that the estimated effect of foreign tariffs on the degree of matching is  0.014 0.035×            (see 
column 1 of Table 2). For industries with a positive value of our comparative advantage measure, the effect of 
foreign tariffs on the degree of matching ranges from 0.014 to 0.035×0.936 where the 0.936 is the comparative-28 
 
In Davidson et al. (2012) we presented some non-parametric evidence on trade and worker-firm 
matching.  Using an alternative measure of the degree of matching based on the shift in that distribution 
of workers and firms by skills and technology and our binary measure of trade orientation, we obtained 
results very similar to the estimates reported in column 1 of Table 7. 
In column 3, an industry is defined as having a comparative advantage if the industry had a 
positive average of net exports over the sample period. In column 5 an industry is defined as having a 
comparative advantage if the industry had more years with positive net exports than with negative net 
exports over the sample period. Since 90% of the industries have consistent trade status based on these 
alternative measures, it is no surprise that the estimates based on these alternative definitions of trade 
status are very close.  
Overall, Table 7 shows that our key result remains unchanged when alternative measures of trade 
status are used: increased openness has a stronger positive effect on the degree of matching for industries 
with greater comparative advantage. 
G.  Excluding outliers 
A closer look at our industry data revealed a few very large changes in tariff rates on Swedish 
exports for the Manufacture of tobacco products and the Manufacture of weapons and ammunition. To 
examine how robust our results are, we therefore conduct a few additional estimations where the outliers 
are  excluded  (Table  8).  We  use  three  different  approaches:  to  exclude  the  specific  industry-year 
observations with large changes in tariff rates; to exclude all years for those two industries that have seen 
large changes in tariffs at some point during 1995-2005; and to use moving average to smooth large 
changes in tariffs. The estimates are similar to the results for the full sample.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
advantage measure for the industry of mining of iron ores (see Table A8). This implies an average effect of (0.014 
0.035×0.936) 2  0.023. Similarly, for industries with a negative value of our comparative advantage measure, the 
effect of foreign tariffs on the degree of matching ranges from 0.014 to 0.014 0.035×(0.860) where the 0.860 is 
the comparative-advantage measure for the manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles. This suggests an average 
effect of (0.014 0.035×0.860) 2  29 
 
H.  Can we trust the firm effect? 
The AKM approach tests for positive assortative matching by calculating the correlation between 
the firm effect and the worker effect that comes out of a basic wage regression.   This approach has been 
criticized in a recent contribution by Lopes deMelo (2009), which focuses on the AKM approach’s ability 
to correctly rank firms in terms of productivity.
26  In a model with on-the-job-search in which firms earn 
steady-state profits, very much in the spirit of Shimer and Smith (2000), Lopes de Melo and argues t hat 
while  wages  will  be  monotonically  increasing  in  a  worker’s  human  capital,  they  may  be  non-
monotonically related to firm productivity.  The reason for this possibility is that stronger firms, because 
they have better outside options, will be in a better bargaining position with weak workers and may be 
able to pay such workers lower wages than other, weaker firms. The implication is that while the worker 
effect that is generated by the AKM wage regression can be used to rank workers, the firm effect may 
generate an incorrect ranking of firms.
27    While this is certainly an interesting theoretical possibility, it is 
hard to know just how important this effect is in practice.  Thus, to see if there might be some problem 
with the firm effects that the AKM approach generates for our study, we examine them in some detail to 
see if the ranking that they generate for firms seems sensible.  In general, one would expect that more 
productive firms will tend to be bigger, more capital intensive, export a larger share  of their output, and 
do more R&D activities. We find that the estimated firm effects are  monotonically increasing in labor 
productivity, firm size in terms of capital stock and employment, capital intensity, R&D intensity, and 
export  intensity.
28  We  also  calculate  the  correlation  between  the  firm  effects  and  various  firm 
characteristics, as shown in Table A7 of the appendix. We find that all of the observed firm characteristics 
                                                           
26 See also Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). 
27 One implication of this is that the AKM approach tends to bias estimated correlations toward zero. Lopes de Melo 
argues that this is one of the reasons that previous studies of labor market matching have had difficulty finding 
evidence of positive assortative matching.  It is important to note that we find a positive correlation between worker 
and firm effects despite this possible bias. 
28 We regress firm effects on observed firm characteristics and a quadratic term of them. All of the quadratic terms 
are significantly negative, indicating that the relationship between firm effects and observed firm characteristics is 
nonlinear. However, we find that this relationship is monotonically increasing for more than 99% of firms in our 
sample. Details about this result are available upon request. 30 
 
are significantly and positively correlated with our firm quality measure, strongly suggesting that the 
ranking we are getting from AKM seems to make sense.  
6.  Conclusion   
This is one of the first empirical papers to investigate the impact of globalization on the efficiency 
of matching between heterogeneous firms and heterogeneous workers within industries.
29  Using matched 
worker-firm data from Sweden, we find strong evidence that increased openness improves the ma tching 
process in industries with greater comparative advantage while having no significant effect on matching 
in  industries  with  weaker  comparative  advantage .    These  results  are  broadly  consistent  with  the 
theoretical predictions of Davidson, Matusz and S hevchenko (2008) and Davidson and Matusz (2010).  
These papers argue that the self -selection of heterogeneous firms into exporting will improve the 
efficiency of the matching process when trade costs fall and that increased import penetration  may have 
an ambiguous impact on matching.  Our empirical results suggest that globalization will generate a 
previously unnoticed pure gain to countries involved in trade:  The increased access that domestic firms 
gain to world markets will lead to better matching in th e labor market without increased import 
penetration causing a countervailing loss. 
We have subjected our results to a wide variety of robustness checks.   These results hold for 
alternative measures of our key variables and persist when we control for technical change at the industry 
level, domestic anti-competitive regulations and product market competition.  They are also robust to the 
inclusion of match effects, and we have demonstrated that the results are not driven by outliers.  Thus, our 
results appear to be quite robust.    
    
 
   
                                                           
29 There is some recent empirical work using matched employer-employee data to look at labor market effects of 
trade, particularly the impact of trade on wages and income distribution.  For example, see Frías, Kaplan, and 
Verhoogen (2009), Krishna, Poole, and Senses (2011) and Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding (2012).  31 
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Table 1 Individual Worker Wage Regressions 1995-2005  
 
OLS     LSDVreg 
 
(1)     (2) 
Experience  0.0243***     
  (0.0001)     
Experience^2/100  -0.0798***    -0.001*** 
  (0.0009)    (0.0000) 
Experience^3/1000  0.0108***    0.0012*** 
  (0.0003)    (0.0002) 
Expereience^4/10000  0.0007***    -0.0006*** 
  (0.0000)    (0.0000) 
Blue collar  -0.1909***    -0.0273*** 
  (0.0002)    (0.0003) 
Female  -0.1394***     
  (0.0002)     
        Capital intensity  0.0494***    -0.0028*** 
  (0.0002)    (0.0001) 
Size  0.0003***    0.0049*** 
  (0.0000)    (0.0001) 
Labor productivity  0.0494***    0.0067*** 
  (0.0002)    (0.0001) 
Share of high skill  0.3376***    0.0739*** 
  (0.0006)    (0.0012) 
Manufacturing  0.0214***    0.0506*** 
  (0.0003)    (0.0011) 
Share of women  -0.1266***    0.1297*** 
  (0.0005)    (0.0016) 
Manufacturing*share of women  0.0327***    -0.1705*** 
  (0.0009)    (0.0029) 
        Time dummies  Yes    Yes 
Individual fixed effect  No    Yes 
Firm fixed effect  No    Yes 
        Number of observations  9,452,970    9,452,970 
R
2  0.4075       
Note: Column 2 reports the estimates of equation (2). See Section 3.B for more details about 
the estimation. *** p<0.01  39 
 
Table 2 Openness and assortative matching: baseline results 
   
Firm effect and 
worker effect 
 









effect and worker 
effect 
   
(1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
Foreign tariffs 
 
0.0144***    0.0416***    0.0469*** 
 
0.00724** 
   




×  Foreign tariffs   




(0.00732)    (0.0265)    (0.0219) 
 
(0.00708) 
                 
R
2     0.065     0.043     0.037     0.048 
Notes: The dependent variable is the degree of matching. It is measured as the correlation coefficient between firm total effects and 
worker total effects in column 1, the correlation coefficient between firm total effects and the worker total effects averaged across all 
workers employed in the firm in column 2, the correlation coefficient between firm total effects and the median worker total effects 
for all workers employed in the firm in column 3, and the correlation coefficient between unobserved firm and unobserved worker 
effects in column 4. The tariff data are transformed so that an increase in the independent variable Foreign Tariffs represents more 
openness. The variable "comparative-advantage" represents the trade status of an industry which is measured as the value of net 
exports as a share of total trade for 1995. All of the regressions include industry and year fixed effects. There are 860 observations 
and 88 industries. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by industries. See Section 3 for more details about data and 
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  Table 3 Alternative measures of openness    
  Contemporaneous openness    Openness at a 1-year lag 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6) 
Foreign tariffs  0.0144***  0.0146***      0.0138***  0.0138***   
 
(0.00295)  (0.00275)      (0.00245)  (0.00234)   
Comparative-advantage × Foreign tariffs   0.0347***  0.0351***      0.0403***  0.0401***   
 
(0.00732)  (0.00671)      (0.00655)  (0.00593)   
Swedish tariffs    0.0233        0.00546   
 
  (0.0151)        (0.0130)   
Comparative-advantage × Swedish tariffs    0.00688        0.00419   
 
  (0.0246)        (0.0261)   
MNE share      0.0699        0.104** 
 
    (0.0579)        (0.0473) 
Comparative-advantage × MNE share      0.357**        0.285** 
 
    (0.159)        (0.131) 
               
R
2  0.065  0.070  0.073 
 
0.081  0.081  0.080 
Observations  860  860  860 
 
766  766  766 
Number of industries  88  88  88     87  87  87 
Note: This table examines the robustness of our baseline results to alternative measures of openness. The dependent variable is the degree of 
matching, which is measured as the correlation coefficient between firm total effects and worker total effects. The variable "comparative-
advantage" represents the trade status of an industry which is measured as the value of net exports as a share of total trade for 1995.  The 
tariff data are transformed so that an increase in the independent variables Foreign Tariffs and Swedish Tariffs represents more openness.  All 
of the regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by industries. See Section 3 




   




Orthogonal match effects 
 
Hybrid mixed match effects 
 
(1)     (2)  (3)     (4)  (5) 
Foreign tariffs  0.0144***    0.0156***  0.0159***    0.0112***  0.0100*** 
 
(0.00295)    (0.00295)  (0.00279)    (0.00319)  (0.00296) 
Comparative-advantage × Foreign tariffs   0.0347***    0.0328***  0.0334***    0.0182**  0.0149** 
 
(0.00732)    (0.00725)  (0.00672)    (0.00766)  (0.00732) 
Swedish tariffs        0.0222      -0.00187 
 
      (0.0153)      (0.0138) 
Comparative-advantage × Swedish tariffs        0.00441      0.0335* 
 
      (0.0249)      (0.0190) 
               
R
2  0.065     0.063  0.068     0.059  0.065 
Notes: The dependent variable is the degree of matching. See Section 4.C for more details about the measurements of the degree 
of matching when match effects are accounted for.  The tariff data are transformed so that  an increase in the independent 
variables Foreign Tariffs and Swedish Tariffs represents more openness. The variable "comparative-advantage" represents the 
trade status of an industry which is measured as the value of net exports as a share of total trade for 1995. All of the regressions 
include industry and year fixed effects. There are 860 observations and 88 industries. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
clustered by industries. Also see Section 3 for more details about data and measurement. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 42 
 
Table 5 Controlling for technical change at the industry level  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Foreign tariffs  0.0144***  0.0140***  0.0144***  0.0141***  0.0138*** 
 
(0.00296)  (0.00288)  (0.00295)  (0.00294)  (0.00289) 
Comparative-advantage ×  Foreign tariffs  0.0347***  0.0342***  0.0347***  0.0345***  0.0342*** 
  (0.00734)  (0.00721)  (0.00732)  (0.00725)  (0.00720) 
ICT investments  -0.0144        -0.023 
 
(0.0335)        (0.034) 
R&D intensity    0.0003      0.0003 
 
  (0.0002)      (0.0002) 
Growth in capital      0.002    -0.0004 
 
    (0.004)    (0.003) 
Growth in capital intensity        0.006  0.006 
 
      (0.004)  (0.005) 
           
R
2  0.065  0.078  0.065  0.067  0.080 
Observations  860  816  855  855  816 
Number of industries  88  84  88  88  84 
Note: This table adds proxies for technical change at the industry level. The dependent variable is the degree of 
matching, which is measured as the correlation coefficient between firm total effects and worker total effects.  The 
variable "comparative-advantage" represents the trade status of an industry which is measured as the value of net 
exports as a share of total trade for 1995.  The tariff data are transformed so that an increase in the independent 
variable Foreign Tariffs represents more openness. ICT investment is the investment in computing and communication 
equipment as a share of total investment. R&D intensity is R&D expenditures per employee. Growth in capital and 
growth in capital intensity are annualized growth rates. All of the regressions include industry and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by industries. See Section 3 for more details about 




   
Table 6 Controlling for domestic deregulations and product market competition 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Foreign tariffs  0.0120***  0.0128***  0.0109*** 
 
(0.00268)  (0.00234)  (0.00202) 
Comparative-advantage ×  Foreign tariffs  0.0307***  0.0310***  0.0273*** 
  (0.00687)  (0.00596)  (0.00545) 







Product Market Competition    0.00351  0.00341 
 
  (0.00273)  (0.00271) 
       
R
2  0.080  0.080  0.092 
Observations  860  769  769 
Number of industries  88  77  77 
Note: This table adds measures of domestic deregulations and product market competition at the industry level. The 
dependent variable is the degree of matching, which is measured as the correlation coefficient between firm total 
effects and worker total effects. The variable "comparative-advantage" represents the trade status of an industry 
which is measured as the value of net exports as a share of total trade for 1995. The tariff data are transformed so that 
an increase in the independent variable Foreign Tariffs represents more openness. The regulatory indicator captures 
the amount of anti-competitive regulations and the construction of product market competition follows Boone (2008) 
and Boone et al. (2007). All of the regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered by industries. See Section 3 for more details about data and measurement. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 44 
 
   
Table 7 Alternative definitions of trade status 
 
Positive net exports in 1995   
Positive average of net 
exports    
More years with positive 
net exports 
 
(1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6) 
Comparative-advantage × Foreign tariffs   0.0215***  0.0227***    0.0226***  0.0244*** 
 
0.0229***  0.0248*** 
 
(0.00635)  (0.00577)    (0.00586)  (0.00527) 
 
(0.00581)  (0.00524) 
Comparative-disadvantage × Foreign tariffs   -0.000929  -0.00107    -0.00118  -0.00141 
 
-0.00122  -0.00146 
 
(0.00160)  (0.00144)    (0.00145)  (0.00123) 
 
(0.00143)  (0.00121) 
Comparative-advantage × Swedish tariffs    0.0170   
 
0.0112 
   
0.0110 
 
  (0.0233)   
 
(0.0226) 
   
(0.0228) 
Comparative-advantage × Swedish tariffs    0.0217   
 
0.0232 
   
0.0235 
    (0.0152)   
 
(0.0157) 
   
(0.0157) 
                 
R
2  0.058  0.062     0.059  0.064     0.059  0.065 
Note: This table examines the robustness of our baseline results to alternative definitions of trade status of an industry. In columns 1-2 an 
industry is defined as having a comparative advantage if this industry has positive net export for 1995, and it is defined as having a comparative 
disadvantage if this industry has negative net export for 1995. In columns 3-4 an industry is defined as having a comparative advantage if this 
industry has positive average of net exports over the sample period 1995-2005. In columns 5-6 an industry is defined as having a comparative 
advantage if this industry has more years with positive net exports. The dependent variable is the degree of matching, which is measured as the 
correlation coefficient between firm total effects and worker total effects. The tariff data are transformed so that an increase in the independent 
variables Foreign Tariffs and Swedish Tariffs represents more openness. All of the regressions include industry and year fixed effects. There 
are 860 observations and 88 industries. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by industries. See Section 3 for more details about 
data and measurement. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 45 
 
Table 8 Excluding outliers 
 
Excluding observations 
with large change in 
foreign tariffs   
Excluding Tobacco 
products, weapons and 
ammunition   
Moving averages of 
large changes in 
foreign tariffs 
  (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6) 
Foreign tariffs  0.0267***      0.0192**      0.0263***   
  (0.00901)      (0.00913)      (0.00606)   
Comparative-advantage industry × Foreign 
tariffs 
0.0456*      0.0444**      0.0455**   
(0.0253)      (0.0204)      (0.0196)   
 
               
Foreign tariffs at a 1-year lag    0.0102***      0.00915      0.0297*** 
    (0.00297)      (0.00812)      (0.0103) 
Comparative-advantage industry × 1 year 
lagged foreign tariffs 
  0.0455***      0.0303*      0.0375** 
  (0.00763)      (0.0182)      (0.0184) 
                 
Observations  857  764    847  755    860  766 
R-squared  0.058  0.091    0.05  0.053    0.067  0.075 
Number of observations  88  87     86  85     88  87 
Notes: The dependent variable is the degree of matching. It is measured as the correlation coefficient between firm total effects and worker total 
effects. In columns 1-2 five observations with large changes in tariffs on Swedish exports are omitted from the regressions, in columns 3-4 the 
Manufacture of Tobacco products and the Manufacture of weapons and ammunition are omitted, and in columns 5-6 moving averages for the 
five observations with large changes in foreign tariffs are applied. The tariff data are transformed so that an increase in the independent variable 
Foreign Tariffs represents more openness. The variable "comparative-advantage" represents the trade status of an industry which is measured as 
the value of net exports as a share of total trade for 1995. All of the regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses are clustered by industries. See Section 3 in the paper for more details about data and measurement. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Variable definitions 
Industry variables 
 
Matching Correlation    Correlation between total firm and total person effects 
MNE share of production  Share of MNEs in total production (sales). 
Foreign tariffs      Tariffs on Swedish export by country of destination, weighted by Swedish export shares in 1995. 
Swedish tariffs                 Swedish (EU) tariffs on products by country of origin, weighted by Swedish imports shares in 1995. 
ICT investments    Capital compensation for computing and communications equipment as a share of total capital compensation 
R&D intensity      R&D expenditures in constant SEK 
Growth in capital    Percentage growth in capital stock 
Growth in capital intensity  Percentage growth in capital intensity 
 
Firm variables 
Capital Intensity    Net property, plant and equipment)/employees (in million SEK). 
Share of females    Number of women/employees 
Firm size      Number of employees 
Share high skilled    Number of high skilled workers with at least 3 years of post- secondary education)/employees 
Labor productivity    Value added/employees 
   
Individual variables    
Wage                  Monthly full-time equivalent salary, including wage, bonus, payment for overtime and work at unsocial hours 
Experience      Age minus number of years of schooling minus seven. 
Education 1       1 if highest level of education is elementary school (<9 years), 0 otherwise  
Education 2      1 if highest level of education is compulsory school (9 years), 0 otherwise  
Education 3      1 if highest level of education is 2 years of upper secondary school, 0 otherwise  
Education 4       1 if highest level of education is 3 years of upper secondary school, 0 otherwise  
Education 5      1 if highest level of education is 4 years of upper secondary school, 0 otherwise  
Education 6      1 if highest level of education is undergraduate or graduate college education, 0 otherwise  
Education 7      1 if highest level of education is doctoral degree, 0 otherwise 
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Table A2  Descriptive statistics    
   
Mean  Std Dev  Observations 
          The degree of matching 
     
 
Firm effect and worker effect  -0.025  0.136  860 
 
Firm effect and average worker effect  -0.074  0.553  860 
 
Firm effect and median worker effect  -0.066  0.538  860 
 
Unobserved firm effect and worker effect  -0.026  0.107  860 
 
Capital intensity and worker schooling  0.000  0.131  860 
          Trade status 
     
 
Net exports/total trade  -0.037  0.383  860 
          Openness 
     
 
Foreign tariffs (%)  1.072  4.969  860 
 
Swedish tariffs (%)  0.828  1.167  860 
 
Multinational sales as a share of total 
sales  0.677  0.268  860 
          Controls for technical change  
     
 
ICT investments  0.210  0.215  860 
 
R&D intensity  63577  98608  816 
 
Growth in capital  0.100  0.637  860 
 
Growth in capital intensity  0.317  1.112  860 
          Controls for domestic product market competition 
   
 
OECD regulatory impact indicator  0.057  0.010  860 
   Product market competition  8.828  2.390  769 
             48 
 
Table A3 Number of observations per person. Based 
on estimations on the period 1995-2005. 
   Obs. per  
     pers.     Freq.         Percent     Cum. 
          1     466,007       22.28       22.28 
          2     298,793       14.28       36.56 
          3     237,687       11.36       47.92 
          4     195,895        9.36       57.29 
          5     175,474        8.39       65.68 
          6     148,201        7.08       72.76 
          7     122,099        5.84       78.60 
          8     105,038        5.02       83.62 
          9     107,184        5.12       88.74 
         10     123,388        5.90       94.64 
         11     112,119        5.36      100.00 
      Total   2,091,885    100.00 
 
Table A4 Number of movers per firm. Based 
on estimations on the period 1995-2005. 
Movers per 
firm              Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
          0            309          3.52        3.52 
      1-  5        1,574        17.93       21.45 
      6- 10          645          7.35       28.79 
     11- 20         914        10.41       39.20 
     21- 30         623          7.10       46.30 
     31- 50         833          9.49       55.79 
    51- 100     1,122        12.78       68.56 
       >100      2,760        31.44      100.00 
      Total       8,780      100.00 
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Table A5 Share of total movers 
 
Within comparative advantage industries  39% 
Within comparative dis-advantage 
industries   37% 
From comp. adv. to comp. dis-adv.    13% 
From comp. dis-adv. to comp. adv.    11% 
         
 
1-digit level industries 
 
          Within industries 
   
83% 
Between industries 
   
17% 
         
 
2-digit level inudstreis 
 
          Within industries 
   
65% 
Between industries 
   
35% 
         
 
3-digit level industries 
 
          Within industries 
   
58% 
Between industries 
   
42% 
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Table A6 Correlations Between Firm and Worker Attributes 1995-1995 
 
  Correlation coefficient 
between firm and worker 
unobservable effects  
Correlation coefficient 
between firm and 
workers total effects  
 
 










Workers observed at least 2 periods  0.0477  0.1038 
 
Workers observed at least 3 periods  0.0316  0.1017 
 
Firms with at least 2 movers  0.0658  0.1082 
 
Firms with at least 5 movers  0.0664  0.1095 
 
Workers with at least 3 observations 
and firms with at least 5 movers 
0.0318  0.1022 
 
 
    Preferred sample     
  
Workers with at least 2 observations 
and firms with at least 5 movers 
0.0481  0.1047 
 
     
Note: The whole sample consists of 9,452,970 observations, and the preferred subsample has 











Labor productivity  0.2132 
 
0.2466 
Firm size in terms of capital stock  0.1296 
 
0.3617 
Firm size in terms of employment  0.1121 
 
0.3268 
Capital intensity  0.1120 
 
0.2223 
R&D/sales (1995-2002)  0.1047 
 
0.1909 
Export/sales   0.2297     0.2457 
        Note: All of the correlations are significantly positive at the 1% level. The total firm 
effects are based on the estimates of equation (2). See Section 3.B for more detail. 
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Table A8 Industries with the largest absolute values of net exports as a share of total trade 
SNI  Industry description  Net exports / Total trade 
 
Panel A Twenty industries with the largest positive value of net exports as a share of total trade 
131  Mining of iron ores  0.936 
201  Sawmilling and planning of wood, impregnation of wood  0.870 
211  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard  0.860 
203  Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery  0.765 
322  Manufacture of television and radio transmitters   0.615 
342  Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles  0.540 
341  Manufacture of motor vehicles  0.527 
232  Manufacture of refined petroleum products  0.499 
352  Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock  0.491 
281  Manufacture of structural metal products  0.410 
244  Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products  0.403 
296  Manufacture of weapons and ammunition  0.390 
212  Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard  0.380 
204  Manufacture of wooden containers  0.337 
295  Manufacture of other special purpose machinery  0.326 
286  Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware  0.301 
271  Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys  0.283 
292  Manufacture of other general purpose machinery  0.273 
141  Quarrying of stone  0.270 
273  Other first processing of iron and steel  0.257 
 
Panel B Twenty industries with the largest negative value of net exports as a share of total trade 
177  Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles  -0.860 
193  Manufacture of footwear  -0.834 
362  Manufacture of jewellery and related articles  -0.825 
182  Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories  -0.809 
192  Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness  -0.748 
335  Manufacture of watches and clocks  -0.673 
142  Quarrying of sand and clay  -0.625 
153  Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables  -0.615 
300  Manufacture of office machinery and computers  -0.578 
321  Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components  -0.569 
156  Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products  -0.470 
233  Processing of nuclear fuel  -0.459 
152  Processing and preserving of fish and fish products  -0.442 
160  Manufacture of tobacco products  -0.434 
316  Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c.  -0.424 
365  Manufacture of games and toys  -0.403 
245  Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations  -0.388 
315  Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps  -0.354 
174  Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel  -0.348 
154  Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats  -0.347 
     